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ABSTRACT
This paper examines how the systematic risk of large commercial real estate owners is associated 
with geographic diversifi cation. It analyzed time- varying equity betas and geographic exposure 
of publicly traded pure- play lodging REITs. Contrary to popular expectation, results of this study 
showed that stock investors perceive smaller risk in geographic focus rather than in diversifi cation. 
Further, regional focus becomes insignifi cant in reducing the risk if the focus expands beyond two or 
three regions. The fi ndings were robust to multiple measures of geographic diversifi cation. As such, 
the study reaffi  rmed the impact of geographic focus in the context of commercial real estate as a risk 
minimization strategy.
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Introduction
Firms diversify their product portfolio aiming to 
capture a diverse range of cash fl ow streams and 
minimize the risk. Th e total risk a fi rm is exposed 
to has two main components: systematic and fi rm- 
specifi c. In theory, the latter can be diversifi ed away 
although the systematic risk cannot. Th erefore, the 
systematic risk aff ects a company’s cost of equity and 
is priced as such. As equity investors price this risk 
based on their perception of the risks involved with 
a fi rm’s business, the fi rms respond by attempting 
to minimize this risk through diversifi cation. One 
such strategy is aimed at geographic diversifi cation 
(J. C. Hartzell et al., 2014). Tourism and hotel indus-
tries, in particular, are known for their preference 
for diversifi cation (Sharpley & Vass, 2006; S. Lee, 
2008; Das, Smith, & Gallimore, 2018).
While conventional wisdom suggests a nega-
tive association between diversifi cation and risk, 
the notion of diversifi cation deserves more careful 
consideration. Location- specifi c businesses such 
as real estate and hotels may need to employ local 
know- how to manage their assets. Th us, geographic 
diversifi cation may pose managerial challenges 
(Landier et al., 2009; John et al., 2011; Cashman 
et al., 2014; Das & Th omas, 2016), which may lead 
to uncertainties. Lodging- focused, publicly traded 
Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) off er an 
appropriate sample to test the impact of geographic 
diversifi cation on systematic risk. As Figure 1 sug-
gests, REIT- owned hotels exhibit vast geographic 
footprint.
With its lodging focus and regulatorily required 
focus on operating real estate assets, our sample rep-
resents hotel ownership businesses, and the publicly 
traded status of REITs aff ords us the required data 
to test the association. With the REIT status, a real 
estate owner avoids corporate taxation by meeting 
certain criteria, such as restricting most assets, oper-
ations, and income to real estate assets and distrib-
uting most of the taxable income to shareholders. 
By 2015, U.S. REITs had a market capitalization 
of nearly $900 billion and have become a popular 
mechanism of holding hotel real estate (Jackson, 
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2008; J. Kim & Jang, 2012). Yet, earlier studies on 
the systematic risk of REITs (such as Gyourko & 
Nelling, 1996; Adams et al., 2015; Sing & Patel, 2001; 
Eichholtz et al., 1995; S. Lee & Byrne, 1998; Ling et 
al., 2018) have broadly ignored the lodging sector 
(Manning et al., 2015; Worsley, 2015). Besides, the 
geographic diversifi cation strategy has received lim-
ited attention from the scientifi c community (Ling 
et al., 2018) in general. To our knowledge, this is the 
fi rst study to associate geographic diversifi cation 
with systematic risk in lodging REITs.
We developed time- varying property portfolios 
of 17 lodging REITs listed on U.S. stock exchanges 
between 1997 and 2016 on a quarterly basis. We uti-
lized multiple measures of geographic focus (which 
is the converse of diversifi cation) from this data such 
as the Herfi ndahl index and the entropy index across 
selected top regions (by REIT- specifi c asset share). 
We enhanced the dataset with stock market and 
fi rm- specifi c fi nancial data and applied the dataset 
to fi xed- eff ects panel data analysis. In line with ear-
lier studies (Gyourko & Nelling, 1996; Byrne & Lee, 
2011; Cheng & Roulac, 2007), we found a signifi cant 
link between geographic exposure and beta. How-
ever, contrary to earlier studies, we discovered that 
REITs with geographically concentrated hotel port-
folios experience signifi cantly lower systematic risk. 
Th e introduction of a new region in the portfolio 
rather increases the beta by 0.06 to 0.08. Geographic 
focus measured by the Herfi ndahl index has a neg-
ative association with the beta. Geographic focus in 
two regions is associated with the highest reduction 
in beta (−5 to −8) followed by reduction associated 
with three (−2 to −5). Focusing on too many geo-
graphic regions does not off er any signifi cant reduc-
tion in the beta. Our fi ndings are robust to multiple 
measures of geographic diversifi cation and sys-
tematic risk, and are reported aft er controlling for 
known determinants of beta.
Background
Capital markets price the systematic risk in a secu-
rity, which cannot be diversifi ed away.
In stocks, such risk is measured by the stock mar-
ket beta. Based on the Capital Asset Pricing Model 
(CAPM) developed by Sharpe (1963, 1964) and 
Lintner (1965) the systematic risk ( ) is defi ned as 
the extent of exposure a security (i) has to the mar-
ket. Th e beta is estimated based on the following 
model:
 ( ) =  + [ ( ) − ] (1)
Here, ( ) is the expected return of security i,  
is the risk- free rate,  is the return of the market 
portfolio, and  is the systematic risk of the secu-
rity i. Th e beta can be estimated using a time- series 
Figure 1. Geographic Footprint of Hotels Owned by REITs Worldwide
Source: Authors, ESRI.
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regression (Sharpe et al., 1974) as follows, where sub-
scripts t and i index time and security, respectively: ,t =  + ̂  m,t +  (2)
In Equation (2),  is the coeffi  cient of the inter-
cept, ̂  is the coeffi  cient of the slope, and  is the 
error term. Th e systematic risk expresses investors’ 
expectations about how security i will be aff ected by 
macroeconomic factors. Financial literature suggests 
that the beta can be infl uenced by a fi rm’s (fi nancial) 
policies such as leverage, liquidity, dividends, invest-
ment (growth), and profi tability (Logue & Merville, 
1972).
REITs, Systematic Risk, and Diversifi cation
In 1960 REITs were created by the U.S. Congress 
to make investing in large income producing real 
estate possible for all investors. Beginning in 1993, 
REITs have become increasingly focused in specifi c 
types of real estate (H. Kim, Gu, & Mattile, 2002; 
Das, Ziobrowski, & Coulson, 2015). Hotel REITs, 
in particular, represent nearly 4.5% of the FTSE 
NAREIT All REITs Index based on market capital-
ization (NAREIT, 2015). Ro and Ziobrowski (2011) 
reported that most REITs are specialized in one 
property type based on the belief that there is a spe-
cifi c management expertise based on property type. 
However, their comparison between specialized and 
diversifi ed REITs showed that the systematic risk of 
specialized REITs is higher. Others have focused on 
comparing the performance of specialized REITs 
among each other and found that lodging REITs 
are the most volatile (Jackson, 2009; Worsley, 2015) 
and, by inference, face the challenge of developing 
specifi c strategies to minimize the risk (Low et al., 
2015).
One such strategy is to diversify the property port-
folio geographically (H. Kim, Gu, & Mattila, 2002). 
Geographic diversifi cation is one of the most com-
mon strategies employed for risk reduction by real 
estate investors (Cheng & Roulac, 2007; Cotter et al., 
2015; Eichholtz et al., 1995; Nelson & Nelson, 2003; 
S. Lee & Byrne, 1998). In fact, geography is more 
commonly used as a means for diversifi cation than 
diversifi cation across property types (Sing & Patel, 
1 Th e National Council of Real Estate Investment Fiduciaries (NCREIF) divides the United States into specifi c regions.
2001). Yet, we could not fi nd any study that empiri-
cally examined the impact of geographic diversifi ca-
tion on the systematic risk of lodging REITs.
Disadvantages of Geographic Diversifi cation
Th e notion of risk mitigation through geographic 
diversifi cation is mostly anecdotal, and there is 
no strong consensus regarding the relationship 
between risk and geographic dispersion. Eichholtz 
et al. (1995) found potential for geographic diver-
sifi cation for retail real estate but not for offi  ce real 
estate in the United States. Cotter et al. (2015) found 
that there is a rather limited potential for risk reduc-
tion through geographic diversifi cation in the U.S. 
housing market. In a contrasting stream of stud-
ies, John et al. (2011) showed that remote locations 
increase the cost of shareholder oversight thus lead-
ing to agency problems. As a result, a geographically 
remote location forces a fi rm to provide higher div-
idends. Landier et al. (2009) examined the impact 
of geographic dispersion on a fi rm’s decisions. Th eir 
fi ndings suggested that fi rms perceive more risk in 
a geographically dispersed portfolio. Firms are less 
confi dent about the “soft  information” related to far-
ther assets. Such an eff ect will be more pronounced 
in REITs due to localized nature of their main assets, 
i.e., real estate. Cashman et al. (2014) and Das and 
Th omas (2016) reported such issues specifi cally 
in the context of REITs. By inference, geographic 
diversifi cation may aggravate the information avail-
able both to the managers and investors and may 
lead to agency problems that add to risk.
Measures of Geographic Diversifi cation
Gyourko and Nelling (1996) used broad NCREIF1 
geographic classifi cation of assets. However, the 
study did not report a signifi cant association 
between equity beta and the region- specifi c distri-
bution of assets. D. Hartzell et al. (1987) used the 
Salomon Brothers’ eight regions (New England, 
Mid- Atlantic Corridor, Old South, Industrial Mid-
west, Farmbelt, Mineral Extraction Area, Southern 
California, and Northern California) with the aim 
of creating regions based on common economic 
factors (“Economic Regions,” hereaft er). Byrne and 
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Lee’s (2011) fi ndings, which suggest risk reduction 
due to diversifi cation, concurred with the notion 
that economically based geographic diversifi cation 
is superior to administratively based geographic 
diversifi cation (e.g., NCREIF). Gyourko and Nelling 
(1996) regress the beta with a REIT’s share of prop-
erties within specifi c regions. However, this method 
ignored the overall geographic focus (or lack thereof; 
i.e., diversifi cation). J. C. Hartzell et al. (2014) used 
the number of regions (i.e., geographic footprint) in 
which a REIT owns properties to measure the extent 
of geographic diversifi cation. Further, both of the 
above- mentioned studies employed the Herfi ndahl 
index as a measure of geographic focus as follows: ℎ   = ∑ =1 2 (3)
Where,  is the percentage of a REIT’s total assets 
invested in region i and N is the number of geo-
graphic regions. If a REIT has a signifi cant amount 
of its assets in a small number of regions this would 
increase the value of the index, which may reach the 
maximum of one if all assets are invested in only one 
region. Based on An et al. (2011), we also employed 
the entropy index as a measure of a REIT’s portfolio 
focus in selected top regions as follows:  = − ∑ =1 +1  + (1 − ∑ =1 )
 +1(1 − ∑ =1 ) (4)
Here,  is the proportion of the assets located 
in region i, which is one of the top N regions (by 
proportion of assets) in a REIT’s real estate portfo-
lio. N can assume any whole number less than the 
total number of regions in a portfolio. For a given 
N, the larger the entropy index, the higher the con-
centration of assets within the top N regions. While 
the number of regions (COUNT) in which a REIT 
owns assets refl ects geographic diversifi cation, the 
Herfi ndahl and entropy indices refl ect the converse, 
i.e, geographic focus. For illustrative purposes, we 
constructed an imaginary property portfolio of 
ten REITs spread across eight regions, as shown in 
Figure 2.
With a decreasing geographic footprint (i.e., 
COUNT), the measures of geographic focus (Her-
fi ndahl and entropy indices) increase. For example, 
the entropy (for all N’s) of REIT- 2 is larger than 
Figure 2. Illustrative Example for Comparing Herfi ndahl Index to Entropy Indices
Source: Authors. The image illustrates ten imaginary REITs with diff erent asset allocations to an exhaustive set of eight 
geographic regions. This illustrative example is supported by Appendix Table 1, which lays out diff erent geographic 
concentration measures for a REIT’s geographic asset allocations.
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that of REIT- 1 implying that REIT- 2 has more con-
centration of properties within its top N regions. 
However, one must not compare the entropy across 
N’s (top- 2 regions versus top- 3 regions) for a REIT 
because changing entropy across diff erent values of 
N within a REIT may be a statistical artefact.2 Sim-
ilarly, the entropy and Herfi ndahl indices are not 
mutually comparable. As COUNT and Herfi ndahl 
indices use the universe of a REIT’s portfolio infor-
mation, the association between them is strictly 
negative. However, there is less redundancy between 
these measures and there may be a positive or neg-
ative correlation between Herfi ndahl and entropy 
indices for a given REIT. In Appendix Table 2 we 
present the correlation matrix of various Herfi nd-
ahl and entropy measures across NCREIF and Eco-
nomic Regions.
Data
We started with a sample of quarterly data on 20 
REITs specialized in lodging properties. Th ree 
REITs3 were excluded due to insuffi  cient data. For 
the remaining 17 REITs, we retrieved their daily 
total return data from the SNL fi nancial database, 
adjusted for dividends and stock splits. Th e quarterly 
return is the percentage change between the closing 
price of the last day of a quarter and the closing price 
of the last day of the following quarter. We extracted 
the risk- free rate, and the stock market factors from 
Kenneth French’s website. Our choice of quarterly 
frequency was dictated by that of the fi nancial infor-
mation available for REITs from the SNL database.
Th e data on past property transactions, the loca-
tion of the properties, and the current portfolio 
holdings of the REITs came from the SNL fi nan-
cial database. Starting with the current portfolio 
we re- created the past, time- varying portfolios by 
subtracting acquisitions and adding dispositions 
backward through time.4 We applied this method 
2 See Appendix Table 1 for details.
3 Ashford Hospitality Prime, Xenia Hotels & Resorts, and Apple Hospitality REIT.
4 In the transaction history data, there are two properties located in the United States for which we do not have the exact address. As 
these properties represent only 0.12% of overall transactions and less than 1.5% of the number of properties in the portfolio of their 
respective REIT, these properties were removed from the sample under the assumption that they do not have a signifi cant impact.
5 States are attributed to NCREIF regions as follows: (1) NE (Northeast): ME, VT, NH, NY, CT, RI, MA, PA, NJ; (2) ME (Mideast): 
MD, WV, VA, KY, NC, SC, DC, DE; (3) SE (Southeast): TN, GA, FL, AL, MS; (4) EN (East North Central): MI, IL, OH, IN, WI; (5) 
WN (West North Central): MN, IA, MO, KS, NE, SD, ND; (6) SW (Southwest): TX, OK, AR, LA; (7) MT (Mountain): MT, ID, WY, 
UT, CO, NM, AZ, NV; (8) PC (Pacifi c): WA, OR, CA, AK, HI.
to create the past geographic portfolios based on 
eight NCREIF regions (“NR”) and the Salomon 
Brothers’ eight economic regions (“ER”) as classi-
fi ed by SNL fi nancial.5 However, unlike the Gyourko 
and Nelling’s (1996) study, which was based on 
four NCREIF regions (East, Midwest, South, and 
West), we use a more granular classifi cation of eight 
NCREIF regions (East North Central, Mideast, 
Mountain, Northeast, Pacifi c, Southeast, Southwest, 
and West North Central). We excluded the quarters 
preceding the earliest transaction data available for 
each REIT. For each quarter, once all the past portfo-
lios were created based on number of properties we 
turned the counts into percentages of their respec-
tive REIT’s total U.S.- based portfolio. Unfortunately, 
the data available on asset values or their cash fl ows 
is very limited. Besides, heterogeneous size calcu-
lation across property types (e.g., land acreage ver-
sus apartment units versus offi  ce suites versus hotel 
rooms) restricted our choice of geographic disper-
sion to be based on the property count. We also cal-
culated the proportion of international properties 
of each REIT versus domestic properties over time 
and included it as a separate variable. Properties in 
Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands were con-
sidered international properties as they do not fall 
into one of the NCREIF or Economic Regions. Due 
to the lack of information about the market value of 
the assets, we based our measures of geographic dis-
persion on the number of properties. Despite being 
hotel- focused, several REITs included in our study 
own non- hotel assets.
We extracted the data on control variables from 
the SNL fi nancial database. Debt leverage is mea-
sured as total debt divided by total assets (J.- S. Lee 
& Jang, 2007; H. Kim, Gu, & Mattila, 2002) and is 
expected to be positively related to beta (Logue & 
Merville, 1972). Growth is the percentage change in 
total assets from one period to the subsequent one 
and is expected to positively aff ect beta (H. Kim, 
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J. Kim, & Gu, 2012; H. Kim, Gu, & Mattila, 2002; 
Logue & Merville, 1972). Profi tability is controlled 
for with return on equity, which is net income 
divided by total equity (H. Kim, Gu, & Mattila, 
2002). Liquidity is measured as one minus Ami-
hud’s illiquidity measure (2002) which is defi ned as 
follows:  (5)
Here, | | is the absolute return of asset i on day d 
in quarter q,  is the dollar volume traded of 
asset i on day d in quarter q, and D  is the number 
of days for which the data is available for stock i in 
quarter q. Also, LIQUIDITY = 1- ILLIQ.
Th e dividend pay- out is measured by the dividend 
pay- out ratio, which is the dividends declared during 
a period as a percent of earnings per share. Negative 
values (caused by negative earnings announced) 
are replaced by zero. Th e dividend pay- out ratio is 
expected to negatively aff ect beta (Logue & Mer-
ville, 1972). Operating effi  ciency was obtained from 
the ratio of recurring revenue to real estate value. 
To control for the eff ect of size, we used the natural 
6 Th e mean market beta of the Fama French three- factor model is slightly lower at 1.126 and the mean market beta estimate of the 
four- factor model is even lower at 0.997.
logarithm of the market capitalization following J. 
C. Hartzell et al. (2014) and Gyourko and Nelling 
(1996). Th e data summary is provided in Table 1. 
We conducted two unit- root tests (Im- Pesaran- Shin 
test and Fisher- type Augmented Dickey- Fuller test 
using the inverse chi- squared method) for each 
variable.
Th e null hypothesis for both these tests denoted 
the presence of unit root. Most variables were found 
to be stationary. Some variables for which the null 
was not rejected were found to be stationary in the 
presence of a trend which we controlled for in our 
models.
Th e betas based on the CAPM ranged between 
−0.376 and 4.271 with a mean of 1.268.6 Th e total 
number of properties located in the United States 
owned by the lodging REITs studied ranges between 
4 and 501 across diff erent REITs and quarters with 
an average of 99.13 properties owned by a given 
REIT during a given time period. Th ese properties 
are spread out across an average of 6.55 NCREIF 
regions or 6.62 Economic Regions. Th e average allo-
cation of a REIT’s U.S. portfolio to each NCREIF 
region ranges between 7.96% for West North 
Table 1. Data Summary
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. IPS Fisher
BETACAPM 677 1.27 0.86 −0.38 4.27 −3.92*** 6.90***
HERF_NR 677 0.27 0.16 0.13 0.69 NA 0.78
ENTROPY2_NR 636 0.01 0.02 −0.05 0.08 NA 1.93**
ENTROPY3_NR 613 0.44 0.06 0.35 0.64 1.35 −1.56
ENTROPY4_NR 558 0.55 0.06 0.39 0.75 −0.90 - 0.86
ENTROPY5_NR 494 0.64 0.05 0.53 0.77 −0.32 0.65
HERF_ER 676 0.27 0.15 0.15 0.68 NA 1.65**
ENTROPY2_ER 635 0.01 0.02 −0.03 0.08 NA 0.94
ENTROPY3_ER 599 0.46 0.05 0.35 0.62 - 0.18 −0.13
ENTROPY4_ER 561 0.56 0.05 0.46 0.69 0.04 −0.40
ENTROPY5_ER 531 0.64 0.04 0.56 0.80 0.40 0.34
GROWTH 675 0.02 0.10 −0.26 1.35 −18.4*** 56.4***
PROFITABILITY 675 0.00 0.07 −0.43 0.41 −17.2*** 51.0***
ILLIQUIDITY 677 3.56E- 06 1.57E- 05 5.54E- 11 1.56E- 04 NA 18.51***
LN_MARKETCAP 676 20.14 1.95 15.45 23.61 0.78 −0.55
DPO_PC 668 0.72 1.11 0.00 9.00 NA 51.82***
OPEFF 670 0.09 0.13 0.01 2.23 - 8.27*** 17.8***
Note: The analysis is based on quarterly data on 17 lodging REITs between 1997 and 2016. GROWTH = percent change in total assets. 
PROFITABILITY = net income/total equity. ILLIQUIDITY = Amihud illiquidity measure. LN_MARKETCAP = natural log of market capitalization. 
DPO_PC = Dividend payout ratio (in percent). OPEFF = recurring revenue/real estate value. HERF = Herfi ndahl index (measurement 
of geographic concentration) of the percent share of properties held in various geographic regions. ENTROPY measures how well 
concentrated are the properties held in a given number (2 through 5) of top geographic regions (by property count). ER and NR suffi  xes 
denote “Economic Region” and “NCREIF” region classifi cations, respectively. The last two columns denote the p- value for the following unit- 
root (null hypothesis) tests: Im- Pesaran- Shin and Fisher- type inverse chi- squared ADF. *** and ** signify p- values at 1% and 5%, respectively.
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Central to 18.82% for the Northeast. For the Eco-
nomic Regions, the range is larger with an average of 
24.08% allocated to the Old South and 6.16% allo-
cated to New England. Th e Herfi ndahl indices based 
on the two regional classifi cations are very similar. 
Th e average Herfi ndahl index based on NCREIF 
regions is 27.25% while that of the Economic 
Regions is slightly higher at 27.32%. Th is indicates 
that on average the lodging REITs are nearly iden-
tically spread out across regions based on NCREIF 
and Economic Regions. Th e overall average of inter-
national properties in the portfolio of a given REIT 
in a given quarter is 2.39. However, most REITs do 
not own any international properties. Host Hotels 
& Resorts has owned up to 42 international proper-
ties within a quarter and is the only lodging REIT in 
our sample which owns properties outside of North 
America. Another four REITs have owned between 
one and six properties in North America but outside 
the United States at any given time.7
Methodology
We developed the time- varying market beta of the 
CAPM (Equation 1) through a 30- month rolling 
window regression. Th e monthly betas were aver-
aged every quarter for further analysis. Our data 
represents an unbalanced panel of 17 REITs over 
78 quarters with time- varying variables. All the 
empirical models represent a variation of the fol-
lowing wherein diff erent measures of ℎ  
 are tested.  = ( , ℎ , ,   , , p , 
  , ℎ   ) (6)
To test for an appropriate estimation method, 
for each of the following model specifi cations, we 
ran the Breusch- Pagan Lagrange multiplier test for 
random eff ects. We rejected the null in all the cases 
implying that the usual OLS regression models are 
not suitable. Further, for each specifi cation, we ran 
7 Th e four REITs are AHT, DRH, FCH, and HPT, and for the purpose of this study “North America outside the United States” 
includes Canada, Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands.
8 When the CAPM beta was regressed with the top- 2 NCREIF regions based entropy.
9 Th e results are consistent and available upon request.
the Hausman test. Except for one specifi cation,8 the 
null was rejected in all cases providing support for 
fi xed- eff ect (FE) models. FE models may be relatively 
ineffi  cient when random eff ects are more suitable but 
provide consistent coeffi  cient estimates. Th erefore, 
we applied FE estimation to all the models. REIT 
ticker symbols served as the fi xed eff ects. Besides, we 
controlled for the market trends in each model using 
annual dummy variables. Using the trend dummy 
controls for the systemic shift s over time in stock risk 
perception by the investors (e.g., recession).
We applied the multiple measures of geographic 
dispersion discussed earlier to two sets of analysis: 
baseline and entropy models. In the baseline mod-
els, we started with the traditional model without 
any geographic focus. Th en, based on Gyourko 
and Nelling (1996) and J. C. Hartzell et al. (2014) 
we included the following variations of Geographic 
diversifi cation (Equations 3 and 4) sequentially: 1) 
geographic footprint, i.e., the count of regions; 2) 
the Herfi ndahl index of the regional breakup; and 
3) share of properties in the regions. Further, in 
“entropy” models, following An et al. (2011), we 
employed the geographic entropy measures (based 
on REIT- specifi c top- 2, - 3, - 4, and - 5 regions) as 
Geographic diversifi cation. As a robustness test, we 
applied similar models to both the NCREIF and the 
Economic Regions classifi cation, in separate sets of 
models. To test whether the fi ndings were robust to 
other measures of systematic risk, we analyzed these 
models for equity beta developed from Fama French 
three- factor and Carhart’s four- factor models as 
well,9 but did not report them for brevity.
Results and Discussion
Tables 2 and 3 present the results of the baseline 
models using the NCREIF and Economic Region 
classifi cations, respectively. Th e results are broadly 
consistent across the two classifi cations.
Th e fi rst (Baseline) model, which is based on ear-
lier fi ndings (i.e., control variables), has the explan-
atory power of 71%. Several REIT fi xed eff ects and 
annual trend dummies were statistically signifi cant 
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in each of the models. Aft erward, we introduced 
geographic variables sequentially. In both the geo-
graphic classifi cations (Tables 2 and 3), control 
variables such as leverage and growth were insignif-
icant, although with expected signs. Th e insignifi -
cant leverage variables support the Modigliani and 
Miller proposition that in absences of taxes (which is 
a prominent characteristic of REITs), capital struc-
 Table 2. Fixed Eff ects Models for CAPM Beta with NCREIF Geographic Classifi cation
Baseline Regional Footprint Regional Herfi ndahl Regional Breakup
LEVERAGE_DA 0.0433 −0.0155 0.0479 0.0858
(0.205) (0.207) (0.205) (0.275)
GROWTH −0.265 −0.247 −0.260 −0.102
(0.168) (0.168) (0.168) (0.163)
PROFITABILITY −0.379 −0.371 −0.379 −0.458*
(0.278) (0.278) (0.278) (0.266)
LIQUIDITY 8,140*** 8,186*** 8,105*** 7,944***
(1,817) (1,815) (1,817) (1,738)
LN_MARKETCAP −0.134*** −0.139*** −0.139*** −0.230***
(0.0293) (0.0294) (0.0298) (0.0361)
DPO_PC −0.0306* −0.0301* −0.0300* −0.0191
(0.0161) (0.0161) (0.0161) (0.0158)
OPEFF 0.366* 0.354* 0.365* 0.343*





















Constant −8,137*** −8,183*** −8,102*** −7,937***
(1,817) (1,815) (1,817) (1,738)
Annual Trend Dummies Included Included Included Included
REIT Fixed Eff ects Included Included Included Included
Observations 659 659 659 659
R- squared 0.712 0.714 0.713 0.744
Note: Dependent variable = CAPM beta. Standard errors in parentheses. Unit of analysis = REIT- Quarter. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. The 
analysis is based on quarterly data on 17 lodging REITs between 1997 and 2016. LEVERAGE_DA = total debt/total assets. GROWTH = percent 
change in total assets. PROFITABILITY = net income/total equity. LIQUIDITY = 1- Amihud illiquidity measure. LN_MARKETCAP = natural log of 
market capitalization. DPO_PC = Dividend payout ratio (in percent). OPEFF = recurring revenue/real estate value. INT_VS_US = international 
properties/US- based properties. Suffi  xes to NCREIF denote proportion of properties held by a REIT in the NCREIF region (ME = Mideast, MT 
= Mountain, NE = Northeast, PC = Pacifi c, SE=Southeast, SW = Southwest, omitted group = West North Central). NCREIF_REG_COUNT = 
number of NCREIF regions in which the REIT holds properties. HERF_NR = Herfi ndahl index (measurement of geographic concentration) of 
the percent share of properties held in various NCREIF regions. The smaller the Herfi ndahl index, the higher the geographic diversifi cation.
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ture has no impact on the cost of capital. GROWTH 
may still have a signifi cant eff ect in the cross- section 
of fi rms. However, the cross- sectional variations are 
already captured in the REIT fi xed eff ects (of which 
several are highly signifi cant, but not reported for 
brevity). In the Regional Breakup models, PROF-
ITABILITY was signifi cantly negative as expected 
implying that increased profi tability reduces the 
Table 3. Fixed Eff ects Models for CAPM Beta with Economic Region Classifi cation
Baseline Regional Footprint Regional Herfi ndahl Economic Regions
LEVERAGE_DA 0.0433 −0.0789 −0.00970 0.284
(0.205) (0.211) (0.204) (0.254)
GROWTH −0.265 −0.238 −0.275 −0.184
(0.168) (0.168) (0.167) (0.162)
PROFITABILITY −0.379 −0.382 −0.359 −0.471*
(0.278) (0.277) (0.277) (0.265)
LIQUIDITY 8,140*** 8,142*** 8,550*** 8,730***
(1,817) (1,811) (1,813) (1,732)
LN_MARKETCAP −0.134*** −0.161*** −0.148*** −0.194***
(0.0293) (0.0314) (0.0296) (0.0382)
DPO_PC −0.0306* −0.0280* −0.0249 −0.0177
(0.0161) (0.0161) (0.0161) (0.0157)
OPEFF 0.366* 0.358* 0.337* 0.362**





















Constant −8,137*** −8,139*** −8,546*** −8,720***
(1,817) (1,811) (1,812) (1,732)
Annual Trend Dummies Included Included Included Included
REIT Fixed Eff ects Included Included Included Included
Observations 659 659 659 659
R- squared 0.712 0.715 0.716 0.748
Note: Dependent variable = CAPM Beta. Standard errors in parentheses. Unit of analysis = REIT- Quarter. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. 
The analysis is based on quarterly data on 17 lodging REITs between 1997 and 2016. LEVERAGE_DA = total debt/total assets. GROWTH = 
percent change in total assets. PROFITABILITY = net income /total equity. LIQUIDITY = 1- Amihud illiquidity measure. LN_MARKETCAP = 
natural log of market capitalization. DPO_PC = Dividend payout ratio (in percent). OPEFF = recurring revenue/real estate value. INT_VS_US 
= international properties/US- based properties. Suffi  xes to ER denote proportion of properties held by a REIT in the Economic Region 
(FARM = Farmbelt, MIDWEST = Industrial Midwest, MIDATL = Mid- Atlantic Corridor, MINERAL = Mineral Extraction Area, NEWENG = New 
England, NORTHCALIF = Northern California, OLDSOUTH = Old South, Omitted Group = Southern California). ER_COUNT = number of 
economic regions in which the REIT holds properties. HERF_ER = Herfi ndahl index (measurement of geographic concentration) of the 
percent share of properties held in various economic regions. The smaller the Herfi ndahl index, the higher the geographic diversifi cation.
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systematic risk. Th e models suggested that LIQUID-
ITY has a signifi cantly positive association with 
beta, which is in line with Jensen and Meckling’s 
(1976) theory of agency costs. We also found that 
fi rm size has a signifi cantly negative association 
with the beta. In particular, each percent increase in 
the fi rm’s MARKETCAP reduces the beta by 0.13 to 
0.23, controlling for other factors. Larger fi rms may 
be able to diversify their portfolios effi  ciently, which 
may lead to reduced systematic risk perception 
(H. Kim, Gu, & Mattila, 2002). REIT investors’ pref-
erence for high dividend pay- out (DPO_PC) is well- 
known. A REIT meeting this expectation signals 
stability, which reduces the risk. Th ese two tables (2 
and 3) show a positive association of operating effi  -
ciency with the beta, which is somewhat puzzling. 
However, latter models (Tables 4 and 5) suggest neg-
ative coeffi  cients. Th e inconsistent coeffi  cient sign 
may be due to this variable’s multicollinearity with 
the geographic variables as refl ected in high Pearson 
correlation coeffi  cients (see Appendix Table 5).
Th e second model (in Tables 2 and 3) describes 
the eff ect of regional footprint. With each addi-
tional NCREIF (Economic) region in the portfolio, 
the beta increases by 0.06 (0.08). Th e coeffi  cients 
are statistically signifi cant implying that a REIT 
with wider geographic exposure compared to other 
REITs of similar characteristics may be perceived 
to be lacking focus, irrespective of how the regional 
classifi cation is visualized. Compared to the baseline 
model, this model shows marginal improvement in 
the R- squared in both the geographic classifi cations. 
Table 4. Fixed Eff ects Models for CAPM Beta with NCREIF Geographic Entropy
Entropy- Top 2 Regions Entropy- Top 3 Regions Entropy- Top 4 Regions Entropy- Top 5 Regions
LEVERAGE_DA 0.208 −0.0728 0.135 0.104
(0.202) (0.209) (0.222) (0.238)
GROWTH −0.198 −0.184 −0.166 −0.165
(0.165) (0.177) (0.182) (0.195)
PROFITABILITY −0.172 −0.0541 −0.0217 0.127
(0.336) (0.342) (0.355) (0.381)
LIQUIDITY 7,000 9,029* 9,202* 10,984*
(4,990) (5,012) (5,438) (5,747)
LN_MARKETCAP −0.171*** −0.220*** −0.276*** −0.314***
(0.0362) (0.0410) (0.0440) (0.0494)
DPO_PC −0.0250 −0.0204 −0.0179 −0.0105
(0.0155) (0.0160) (0.0167) (0.0204)
OPEFF −0.492 −1.614 −2.392** −2.512**









Constant −6,996 −9,023* −9,195* −10,976*
(4,990) (5,012) (5,438) (5,746)
Annual Trend Dummies Included Included Included Included
REIT Fixed Eff ects Included Included Included Included
Observations 624 602 549 485
R- squared 0.746 0.746 0.734 0.733
Note: Dependent variable = CAPM beta. Standard errors in parentheses. Unit of analysis = REIT- Quarter. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. 
The analysis is based on quarterly data on 17 lodging REITs between 1997 and 2016. LEVERAGE_DA = total debt/total assets. GROWTH 
= percent change in total assets. PROFITABILITY = net income /total equity. LIQUIDITY = 1- Amihud illiquidity measure. LN_MARKETCAP 
= natural log of market capitalization. DPO_PC = Dividend payout ratio (in percent). OPEFF = recurring revenue/real estate value. 
INT_VS_US = international properties/US- based properties. ENTROPY measures how well concentrated are the properties held in a given 
number (2 through 5) of top NCREIF regions (by property count) denoted by NR suffi  x. The maller the ENTROPY, the larger the geographic 
diversifi cation in the top regions.
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In the following specifi cation, we replaced the geo-
graphic footprint by regional Herfi ndahl indices. 
Th e NCREIF Herfi ndahl index is insignifi cant; how-
ever, the Economic Region Herfi ndahl index has a 
signifi cantly negative coeffi  cient, which is consistent 
with Gyourko and Nelling (1996). Th e R- squared in 
the NCREIF- based model marginally reduces, but 
slightly improves in the Economic- Region based 
model. Th e fi nding implies that investors are sen-
sitive to the geographic focus of REITs particularly 
when the regional classifi cation is economically 
based. Th e higher the geographic focus, the lower 
the systematic risk.
Finally, similar to Gyourko and Nelling (1996), 
we introduced the allocation of a REIT portfolio to 
various regions. Th is improves the R- squared (74% 
in NCREIF and 75% in Economic Region classifi -
cation). We found that international diversifi ca-
tion has an insignifi cant association with the beta, 
which is in line with studies such as Ziobrowski and 
Ziobrowski (1995) and Stevenson (1999). From 
Table 2, allocation to the NCREIF_PC (Pacifi c) 
region signifi cantly increases the beta (w.r.t. West 
North Central). However, some other regions are 
associated with signifi cantly lower beta (sequen-
tially, from high to low: East North Central, North-
east, Southeast, and Mountain). From Table 3, 
Southern California is associated with the highest 
beta. All other regions are associated with signifi -
cantly lower beta (sequentially, from high to low: 
Table 5. Fixed Eff ects Models for CAPM Beta with Economic Regions Geographic Entropy
VARIABLES Entropy- Top 2 Regions Entropy- Top 3 Regions Entropy- Top 4 Regions Entropy- Top 5 Regions
LEVERAGE_DA 0.231 −0.226 0.0202 0.368*
(0.195) (0.208) (0.222) (0.221)
GROWTH −0.252 −0.109 −0.188 −0.0411
(0.159) (0.161) (0.186) (0.165)
PROFITABILITY −0.299 −0.349 −0.0179 −1.388***
(0.324) (0.337) (0.361) (0.442)
LIQUIDITY 11,614** 3,932 7,012 −101,827**
(4,870) (5,145) (5,564) (48,264)
LN_MARKETCAP −0.199*** −0.173*** −0.265*** −0.194***
(0.0334) (0.0381) (0.0447) (0.0547)
DPO_PC −0.0251* −0.0139 −0.0154 −0.0150
(0.0150) (0.0155) (0.0167) (0.0144)
OPEFF −0.637 −0.140 −2.326** −1.107









Constant −11,610** −3,926 −7,006 101,831**
(4,870) (5,145) (5,563) (48,264)
Annual Trend Dummies Included Included Included Included
REIT Fixed Eff ects Included Included Included Included
Observations 624 589 552 522
R- squared 0.763 0.767 0.746 0.795
Note: Dependent variable = CAPM Beta. Standard errors in parentheses. Unit of analysis = REIT- Quarter. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. The 
analysis is based on quarterly data on 17 lodging REITs between 1997 and 2016. LEVERAGE_DA = total debt/total assets. GROWTH = percent 
change in total assets. PROFITABILITY = net income/total equity. LIQUIDITY = 1- Amihud illiquidity measure. LN_MARKETCAP = natural log of 
market capitalization. DPO_PC = Dividend payout ratio (in percent). OPEFF = recurring revenue/real estate value. INT_VS_US = international 
properties/US- based properties. ENTROPY measures how well concentrated are the properties held in a given number (2 through 5) of top 
economic regions (by property count) denoted by ER suffi  x. The smaller the ENTROPY, the larger the geographic diversifi cation in the top 
regions.
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Mid- Atlantic Corridor, Industrial Midwest, New 
England, Northern California, Mineral Extraction 
Area, and Old South).
In the following step, we posited geographic 
entropy as the measure of geographic focus. Tables 4 
and 5 present the results. Similar to earlier analyses, 
the fi rst table (4) applies the NCREIF regional clas-
sifi cation and the second (5) applies the Economic 
Region classifi cation. Th e estimated models in the 
two tables, otherwise, are the same. As discussed 
earlier, entropy measures consider a REIT’s concen-
tration of assets within its own top N regions. If a 
REIT’s portfolio is scattered in K regions such that 
K>N, then the entropy measure ignores the assets 
in the (K– N) regions. Th erefore, a high entropy 
measure could be interpreted as how geographi-
cally focused a REIT is even within its selected top- 
preferred locations.
Inclusion of entropy measures (based on N = 2, 
3, 4, and 5) substantially improved the explanatory 
power of the models, which went up to 73– 75% in 
NCREIF- based regional classifi cation (Table 4) and 
75– 80% in Economic- Region based geographic clas-
sifi cation (Table 5). Despite their higher R- squared, 
several control variables in the entropy models are 
rendered insignifi cant. Th is further lends support 
to the entropy measure as a more eff ective mea-
surement of geographic focus in REITs as determi-
nants of systematic risk. A more remarkable feature 
of the entropy measures is that with an increase 
in N, the entropy measure’s potential to reduce 
the systematic risk gradually falls. For example, in 
Table 4 (based on NCREIF regional classifi cation) 
the coeffi  cient of ENTROPY2 is −4.7 implying that 
each 0.1 increase in entropy is associated with 0.47 
decrease in beta. However, beta’s sensitivity to the 
entropy reduces to −2.3 if the entropy is based on 
top- 3 regions rather than top- 2 regions as in the ear-
lier model. For ENTROPY4, the coeffi  cient shrinks 
to −1.9 and for ENTROPY5 it further shrinks to 
−0.9 and even becomes insignifi cant. Similarly, in 
Table 5 (based on economic regional classifi cation) 
the coeffi  cient of ENTROPY2 is −8.2 implying that 
each 0.1 increase in entropy is associated with 0.82 
decrease in beta. However, beta’s sensitivity to the 
entropy decreases to −5.3 if the entropy is based on 
10 For further robustness, we also developed beta measures based on Fama French three- factor and Carhart’s four- factor stock pric-
ing models. Th e results were broadly consistent but not reported for brevity.
top- 3 regions rather than 2. For ENTROPY4 and 
ENTROPY5 the coeffi  cients further shrink to −0.29 
and −0.13, respectively, and become insignifi cant. 
Th e results affi  rmed the earlier fi nding in this study 
that geographic focus reduces the systematic risk. 
Besides, staying more focused on a limited num-
ber of regions has signifi cantly stronger potential in 
reducing the systematic risk. If the focus is diluted 
beyond two or three regions, the negative associa-
tion between geographic focus and beta ceases to 
exist.
Conclusion and Implications
As geographic diversifi cation is the most commonly 
adopted diversifi cation strategy by real estate inves-
tors in general (Cheng & Roulac, 2007; Cotter et al., 
2015; Eichholtz et al., 1995; Nelson & Nelson, 2003; 
S. Lee & Byrne, 1998) and tourism/hospitality inves-
tors in particular (Sharpley & Vass, 2006; S. Lee, 
2008), it is important to investigate the eff ectiveness 
of this strategy in reducing the risk. A number of 
studies have focused on identifying the best way to 
diversify geographically in the context of real estate 
investment. However, a contrasting strand of stud-
ies cautions against the increased risk arising from 
geographic diversifi cation (Landier et al., 2009; John 
et al., 2011; Cashman et al., 2014; Das & Th omas, 
2016). We reconciled the earlier fi ndings and applied 
our analysis to a sample of lodging REITs.
We examined the association between geographic 
focus and systematic risk for real estate owners. In 
particular, we applied fi rm- fi xed eff ect models to a 
panel of 17 lodging focused REITs through 20 years 
of quarterly data. Using rolling regression in CAPM 
models, we fi rst developed the time- varying system-
atic risk measure (i.e., beta) for REIT stocks. Further, 
using the asset holding, acquisition and disposition 
history of REITs, we developed a time- varying geo-
graphic composition of each REIT each quarter. For 
robustness, we used two diff erent regional classifi ca-
tions: 1) NCREIF regions and 2) Salomon Brothers’ 
Economic Regions.10 We developed the follow-
ing time- varying measures of geographic focus: 1) 
number of regions in which a REIT holds assets; 2) 
percent allocation of assets to individual regions; 
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3) Herfi ndahl index of the regional allocation; and 
4) diff erent entropy indices of geographic focus in 
two, three, four and fi ve top regions for each REIT. 
We showed that regional allocation has signifi cant 
association with the systematic risk. Increased geo-
graphic footprint (i.e., number of regions) is asso-
ciated with signifi cantly higher beta. Th e Economic 
Region Herfi ndahl index had a signifi cantly nega-
tive association with beta suggesting that regional 
focus reduces the systematic risk. From the analysis 
of entropy indices, we inferred that staying focused 
on one or two regions has the strongest association 
with reduced systematic risk. However, when this 
focus was expanded based on a larger number of 
preferred regions, the association became statisti-
cally insignifi cant.
Our study has business implications. Local soft  
information is a critical determinant for the success 
of location- specifi c businesses such as real estate or 
hospitality, the lack of which may lead to uncertain-
ties for both managers and investors. As a result, the 
systematic risk may increase, giving rise to higher 
required premium on the cost of equity and, by 
inference, to the cost of capital. Higher cost of cap-
ital may adversely impact the asset valuation for a 
fi rm. Th erefore, fi rms such as hotels must develop 
their geographic strategies carefully.
Our study has a few limitations. First, the count 
of assets per region may not be the most effi  cient 
method of measuring the capital allocation to var-
ious regions and is a result of data availability. 
Instead of the asset count, asset values or cash fl ows 
from assets may provide superior measures. Second, 
portfolio managers may consider allocating “risk” to 
regions in addition to the capital allocation. Further 
studies are warranted to expand the scope to other 
property types such as offi  ces and apartments.
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Appendix Table 1. Comparing Measures of Diversifi cation Using Simulated Data
Imaginary Geographic Allocation of Assets Corresponding Measures of Geographic Concentration
Geo1 Geo2 Geo3 Geo4 Geo5 Geo6 Geo7 Geo8 #Locations Herfi ndahl Entropy2 Entropy3 Entropy4 Entropy5
REIT- 1 13% 13% 13% 13% 13% 13% 13% 13% 8 0.125 0.277 0.351 0.431 0.520
REIT- 2 14% 14% 14% 14% 13% 13% 13% 5% 8 0.131 0.287 0.371 0.465 0.564
REIT- 3 14% 14% 14% 14% 14% 14% 14% 0% 8 0.143 0.287 0.371 0.465 0.576
REIT- 4 17% 17% 17% 17% 17% 17% 0% 0% 6 0.167 0.298 0.396 0.515 0.667
REIT- 5 30% 20% 17% 17% 17% 0% 0% 0% 6 0.213 0.306 0.444 0.610 0.878
REIT- 6 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 0% 0% 0% 5 0.200 0.307 0.432 0.600 NA
REIT- 7 25% 25% 25% 25% 0% 0% 0% 0% 4 0.250 0.315 0.500 NA NA
REIT- 8 50% 40% 10% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 3 0.420 0.439 NA NA NA
REIT- 9 50% 50% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 2 0.500 NA NA NA NA
REIT- 10 100% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 1 1.000 NA NA NA NA
Note: The table lays out how various geographic concentration measures could vary across calculation methods for a given REIT. Ten 
imaginary REITs are shown to have diff erent shares of properties within their portfolio across eight imaginary regions.
Appendix Table 2. Correlation Matrix of Various Geographic Concentration Measures Applied to the Quarterly Panel Data of 
REITs
HERF_NR ENT2_NR ENT3_NR ENT4_NR ENT5_NR HERF_ER ENT2_ER ENT3_ER ENT4_ER
HERF_NR 1
ENT2_NR −0.8591 1
ENT3_NR 0.5054 −0.4984 1
ENT4_NR 0.5679 −0.5183 0.9504 1
ENT5_NR 0.3571 −0.3286 0.8 0.8616 1
HERF_ER 0.4863 −0.4617 0.2181 0.2331 0.127 1
ENT2_ER −0.0522 0.072 0.1179 0.1486 0.1692 −0.0331 1
ENT3_ER 0.2089 −0.0921 0.1101 0.1104 −0.0294 0.5258 −0.0896 1
ENT4_ER 0.3567 −0.2298 0.1171 0.1099 −0.0679 0.5353 −0.3195 0.7923 1
ENT5_ER 0.383 −0.3366 0.2686 0.2767 0.1171 0.0801 −0.4125 0.3728 0.6595
Note: HERF = Herfi ndahl index (measurement of geographic concentration) of the percent share of properties held in various geographic 
regions. ENT measures the geographic entropy, i.e., how well concentrated are the properties held in a given number (2 through 5) of top 
geographic regions (by property count). NR and ER suffi  xes denote NCREIF region and Economic Region classifi cations, respectively.
Appendix Table 3. Additional Descriptive Statistics
Variable N Min. Max. Mean Std. Dev.
Fama French Three- Factor Model Beta 677 −1.54 4.82 1.13 0.74
Four- Factor Model Beta 677 −1.60 4.29 1.00 0.66
Total Properties in the US 677 4.00 501.00 99.13 111.21
% EN NR 677 0.00 0.28 0.08 0.05
% ME NR 677 0.00 0.47 0.16 0.10
% MT NR 677 0.00 0.80 0.10 0.18
% NE NR 677 0.00 0.82 0.19 0.19
% PC NR 677 0.00 0.56 0.17 0.14
% SE NR 677 0.00 0.64 0.15 0.11
% SW NR 677 0.00 0.27 0.08 0.07
% WN NR 677 0.00 0.57 0.08 0.13
% Farmbelt 677 0.00 0.66 0.09 0.15
% Industrial Midwest 677 0.00 0.75 0.18 0.12
% Mid- Atlantic Corridor 677 0.00 0.39 0.08 0.07
% Mineral Extraction Area 677 0.00 0.38 0.12 0.09
% New England 677 0.00 0.34 0.06 0.07
% Northern California 677 0.00 0.38 0.06 0.07
% Old South 677 0.00 0.73 0.24 0.17
% Southern California 677 0.00 0.80 0.15 0.18
Number of Economic Regions 677 2.00 8.00 6.62 1.89
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Appendix Table 4. Panel Data Summary of REITs Included 
in the Study
TICKER Freq. Percent Cum.
AHT 42 6.2 6.35
CDOR 77 11.37 17.73
CHSP 16 2.36 20.09
CLDT 13 1.92 22.01
DRH 35 5.17 27.18
FCH 78 11.52 38.7
HPT 74 10.93 49.63
HST 60 8.86 58.49
HT 60 8.86 67.36
IHT 40 5.91 73.26
INN 12 1.77 75.04
LHO 63 9.31 84.34
PEB 17 2.51 86.85
RHP 4 0.59 87.44
RLJ 11 1.62 89.07
SHO 37 5.47 94.53
SOHO 37 5.47 100
Total 677 100
Appendix Table 5. Break Up of Panel Data across Years 
 Year Freq. Percent Cum.
1997 5 0.74 0.74
1998 11 1.62 2.36
1999 12 1.77 4.14
2000 12 1.77 5.91
2001 18 2.66 8.57
2002 24 3.55 12.11
2003 24 3.55 15.66
2004 24 3.55 19.2
2005 24 3.55 22.75
2006 28 4.14 26.88
2007 36 5.32 32.2
2008 44 6.5 38.7
2009 44 6.5 45.2
2010 44 6.5 51.7
2011 44 6.5 58.2
2012 47 6.94 65.14
2013 55 8.12 73.26
2014 64 9.45 82.72
2015 65 9.6 92.32
2016 52 7.68 100
Total 677 100
Appendix Table 6. Correlation of OPEFF with Selected 
Geographic Variables














Note: The analysis is based on quarterly data on 17 lodging REITs 
between 1997 and 2016. OPEFF = recurring revenue/real estate 
value. NCREIF suffi  xes denote the regional classifi cations defi ned 
by the National Council of Real Estate Investment Fiduciaries. The 
variable measures the percentage of properties a REIT has that 
are located in the specifi ed region. NCREIF_REG_COUNT = the 
number of NCREIF regions in which a REIT holds properties. HERF 
= Herfi ndahl index (measurement of geographic concentration) of 
the percent share of properties held in various geographic regions. 
ENTROPY measures how well concentrated are the properties held 
in a given number (2 through 5) of top geographic regions (by 
property count). ER and NR suffi  xes denote “Economic Region” and 
“NCREIF” region classifi cations, respectively.
